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(Slide	   1)	   This	   paper	   is	   about	   elephants	   traversing	   the	   borders	   of	   animality,	  personhood,	  and	  divinity.	  	  Based	  on	  fieldwork	  in	  the	  elephant	  stables	  of	  Nepal	  (Hart	  and	   Locke	   2007,	   Locke	   2008,	   2011a,	   2011b),	   I	   deploy	   the	   metaphor	   of	   the	  kaleidoscope,	   that	   multiple	   mirrored	   cylinder	   through	   which	   the	   act	   of	   looking	  yields	  beautiful	  forms,	  to	  help	  me	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  multiple	  ontological	  states	  and	  multiple	  relational	  modalities	  through	  which	  handlers	  conceive	  of	  and	  engage	  with	  their	  elephants	  in	  the	  hattisar,	  or	  elephant	  stable.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  this	  paper	  also	  tells	  a	  story	  of	  affective	  and	  semiotic	  relations	  in	  a	  multispecies	  total	   institution	  in	  which	  elephant	  and	  human	  bodies	  and	  lifeworlds	  are	  thoroughly	  entangled	  in	  fulfillment	  of	  their	  shared	  role	  in	  and	  around	  the	  territory	  of	  a	  National	  Park.	  	  
(Slide	  2)	  Prologue:	  Beyond	  Anthropomorphism	  During	   my	   time	   living	   and	   apprenticing	   with	   elephants	   and	   their	   handlers	   in	  Chitwan,	  Nepal,	   I	   found	  that	  captive	  elephants	  are	  variously	  accorded	  the	  status	  of	  animal,	  person,	  and	  god.	  	  From	  the	  conventional	  standpoint	  of	  Western	  thought,	  this	  raises	  the	   issue	  of	  anthropomorphism,	  not	  so	  much	  in	   its	  pre-­‐modern	  sense	  of	  the	  attribution	   of	   human	   form	   to	   divinity,	   but	   rather	   in	   its	   modern	   sense	   of	   the	  attribution	  of	  uniquely	  human	  features	  to	  animals	  (Daston	  and	  Mitman	  2005:	  2),	  a	  taboo	   instilled	   in	   animal	   ethologists	   that	   many	   have	   found	   hard	   to	   resist	   (cf.	  Isenberg	  2002).	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  prohibition	  on	  recognizing	  the	  humanity	  of	  animals	   (Fuentes	  2006)	  ought	   to	  be	  anomalous	   if	  we	  consider	   the	  phylogenetic	  model	   of	   evolutionary	   relatedness	   to	   which	   almost	   all	   biologists	   subscribe,	   and	  which	   implicitly	   challenges	   the	   Cartesian	   categorical	   separation	   of	   humanity	   and	  animality	  (Willerslev	  2007:114).	  	  The	  cultural	  primatologist	  Frans	  de	  Waal	  has	  even	  fired	   off	   a	   rhetorical	   salvo	   against	   the	   repudiation	   of	   cross-­‐species	   continuities	   in	  the	   form	   of	   his	   very	   own	   neologism	   –	   ‘anthropodenial’	   (1999).	   	   This	   recognition	  similarly	   informs	   Dominique	   Lestel’s	   discussion	   of	   the	   interrelations	   between	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ethology	  and	  ethnology	  (Lestel	  2006,	  Lestel,	  Brunois	  &	  Gaunet	  2006),	  which	  revisits	  the	   issue	   of	   human	   and	   non-­‐human	   socialities	   after	   the	   controversies	   of	  Sociobiology,	   by	   focusing	   on	  methodological	   convergence	   rather	   than	   imperialist,	  reductive	   theory.	   	  The	  similarities	  of	   the	  etho-­‐	  and	  ethno-­‐	  endeavors	  perhaps	   first	  became	  evident	   in	   the	   fieldwork	  practices	  of	   Jane	  Goodall,	  who	  began	   treating	   the	  Gombe	  chimpanzees	   like	  ethnographic	   subjects,	  which	   in	   turn	   led	   the	  way	   for	   the	  chimpanzee	   cultures	   thesis	   (Wrangham	   et	   al	   1994).	   	   Such	   perspectives	   inform	  Ethnoprimatology	   (see	   Fuentes	   2010),	   an	   emergent	   field	   dedicated	   to	   human-­‐primate	  interactions,	  that	  exemplifies	  the	  application	  of	  a	  multispecies	  ethnographic	  perspective,	   and	   which	   this	   author	   contends	   can	   be	   adapted	   for	   human-­‐elephant	  relations	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  Ethnoelephantology	  (Locke	  &	  Mackenzie	  in	  press).	  	  The	  necessity	   for	   a	   multispecies	   approach	   to	   my	   ethnography	   of	   captive	   elephant	  management	   became	   evident	   when	   I	   realized	   that	   I	   was	   not	   merely	   conducting	  research	   into	  the	  human	  use	  of	  animals	   in	  the	  context	  of	  occupational	  community,	  skilled	   apprenticeship,	   biodiversity	   conservation,	   and	   nature	   tourism,	   but	   also	  rather	   of	   the	   social	   intimacies	   between	   two	   types	   of	   person,	   only	   one	   of	   which	  happens	   to	   be	   human.	   	   To	   re-­‐conceive	   my	   research	   as	   additionally	   involving	  participant	   observation	   with	   non-­‐human	   subjects	   reminded	   me	   of	   the	   humanist	  epistemology	  underlying	   the	  ethnographic	   tradition	  of	   fieldwork	   in	  which	   I	  began	  my	  work	  (cf.	  Kohn	  2007).	  
	  
(Slide	  3)	  Ontological	  States	  and	  Relational	  Modalities	  “Elephants	  are	  just	   like	  people	  too”	  was	  a	  ubiquitous	  refrain	  I	  heard	  from	  many	  of	  my	   elephant	   handler	   companions,	   a	   claim	   I	   realized	   only	   poses	   a	   threat	   to	   an	  ontological	   order	   preoccupied	   with	   what	   Donna	   Haraway	   has	   called	   human	  exceptionalism	  (2008),	  a	  conceptual	  order	  quite	  unlike	   the	  permeable	  one	   I	   found	  myself	  inhabiting.	  	  For	  in	  the	  lifeworld	  of	  the	  Nepali	  elephant	  handlers,	  I	  found	  that	  elephants	   simultaneously	   occupy	   the	   ontological	   states	   of	   animality,	   personhood,	  and	  divinity.	  	  Whilst	  ultimately	  these	  states	  are	  understood	  as	  co-­‐extensive,	  they	  are	  nonetheless	  variably	  emphasized.	  	  Indeed,	  I	  found	  that	  each	  state	  had	  a	  concomitant	  relational	  modality,	  which	  I	  identify	  as	  domination,	  companionship,	  and	  veneration.	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Only	   the	   dynamic	   of	   companionship	   is	   balanced,	   the	   others	   placing	   human	   and	  elephant	  in	  converse	  hierarchies,	  making	  a	  handler	  a	  master	  in	  one,	  and	  a	  devotee	  in	  another.	   	  I	   invoke	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  kaleidoscope	  to	  convey	  the	  fluid	  manner	  by	  which	  the	  relative	  salience	  of	  animality,	  personhood,	  and	  divinity	  continually	  shift,	  the	  configuration	  changing	  according	  to	  spatio-­‐temporal	  activity	   like	  the	  refractive	  turns	  of	  the	  mirrored	  cylinder	  that	  yield	  new	  configurations	  of	  colour	  and	  form.	  	  	  	  Firstly,	   I	   discuss	   the	   state	   of	   personhood	   within	   the	   context	   of	   apprenticeship,	  deriving	   from	  the	  experience	  of	  embodied	  practice,	  and	  emphasizing	   the	  balanced	  modality	  of	   companionship.	   I	   go	  on	   to	  explore	   the	  state	  of	  animality	   that	  emerges	  from	  the	  language	  of	  didactic	  instruction,	  which	  emphasizes	  the	  hierarchic	  modality	  of	   domination.	   	   Arguing	   for	   the	   primacy	   of	   embodied	   practice	   in	   the	   assertion	   of	  elephant	  personhood,	   I	   then	  discuss	   the	  contrasting	  contexts	   in	  which	   these	  other	  states	   become	   salient,	   and	   in	   which	   elephant	   personhood	   is	   seemingly	   de-­‐emphasized.	   	  Finally,	  I	  explore	  the	  conceptual	  order	  implied	  by	  the	  ritual	  practices	  of	  the	  elephant	  stable,	  explaining	  the	  third	  modality	  of	  veneration,	  which	  constitutes	  elephants	  as	  divine	  beings.	  
	  
(Slide	  4)	  Personhood,	  Companionship,	  and	  Embodied	  Practice	  Most	   forms	   of	   tutelary	   apprenticeship	   entail	   the	  mastery	   of	   a	   set	   of	   transposable	  skills,	   transmitted	   from	   expert	   to	   neophyte	   through	   demonstration	   and	   imitation	  (Lave	   and	   Wenger	   1991,	   Lave	   1993).	   	   However,	   the	   skills	   to	   be	   mastered	   in	  apprenticing	  as	  an	  elephant	  handler	  involve	  the	  mastery	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  two	  particular	   sentient	  beings,	   albeit	  mediated	  by	  an	  expert	   tutor.	   	  Whilst	  generic	  skill	  sets	  are	  acquired,	  and	  are	  similarly	  predicated	  upon	  a	  relationship	  between	  a	  neophyte	  and	  an	  expert,	   in	   this	  context	   the	   intended	  outcome	  of	  mastery	  entails	  a	  cross-­‐species	   inter-­‐subjectivity	   of	  mutual	   attunement	   (cf.	   Despret	   2004:125).	   	   	   To	  master	  the	  basic	  skills	  of	  elephant	  handling	  is	  to	  initiate	  an	  intimate	  and	  reciprocal	  relationship	   with	   an	   elephant,	   a	   process	   suggested	   by	   Donna	   Haraway’s	   term	  ‘becoming	   with’	   (2006).	   	   The	   additional	   third	   conscious	   subject	   in	   this	   form	   of	  
	   4	  
apprenticeship	  is	  extremely	  significant	  then	  for	  its	  ontological	  implications	  of	  inter-­‐personal	  subjectivity	  and	  its	  attendant	  modality	  of	  companionship.	  	  	  This	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  personhood	  of	  elephants	  in	  practical	  experience	  -­‐	  one	  learns	  to	   be	   with	   one’s	   elephant	   through	   a	   routine	   in	   which	   time	   spent	   together	   in	   the	  jungle,	   cutting	   grass,	   bathing,	   or	   grazing,	   is	   central,	   and	   which	   entails	   acquired	  proficiency	   in	   interactive	   bodily	   comportment.	   	   Apprenticeship	   learning	   typically	  depends	   on	   the	   development	   of	   an	   empathic	   bond	   between	   tutor	   and	   tutee,	   as	  Gieser	  (2008)	  has	  recently	  argued	  by	  combining	  Tim	  Ingold’s	  emphasis	  on	  practical	  environmental	  engagement	  in	  situated	  social	  relationships	  (2000)	  with	  Kay	  Milton’s	  emphasis	  on	  emotion	  as	  a	  learning	  mechanism	  in	  filtering	  attention	  (2002).	   	  In	  the	  case	   of	   becoming	   an	   elephant	   handler	   (hattisare)	   however,	   the	   object	   of	   one’s	  enskilment	   is	   also	   a	   subject	   accorded	   agency,	   and	   the	   empathic	   bond	   with	   one’s	  elephant	   is	   even	  more	   important,	   as	   I	  myself	   learnt	  with	   Sitasma	  Kali,	   the	   female	  elephant	  with	  whom	  I	  apprenticed,	  and	  as	  all	  the	  hattisare	  regularly	  concurred.	  	  	  For	  an	  elephant	  to	  permit	  you	  to	  care	  and	  ride	  him	  or	  her,	  trust,	  understanding,	  and	  an	   appreciation	   of	   each	   other’s	   dispositions	   is	   vital.	   	   An	   index	   of	   this	   in	   the	  relationship	  Sitasma	  and	  I	  developed,	  was	  the	  ritual	  greeting	  with	  which	  we	  began	  our	   days	   together,	   a	   kind	   of	  material-­‐semiotic	   dance	   representing	  what	   Haraway	  describes	   as	   “embodied	   communication	   that	   takes	   place	   in	   entwined,	   semiotic,	  overlapping,	   somatic-­‐patterning”	   (2006:110-­‐111).	   	   This	   involved	   Sitasma	   hugging	  me	  with	  her	  trunk,	  recognizing	  me	  as	  ‘her	  human’	  through	  my	  smell.	  	  It	  is	  significant	  that	   she	  was	   as	  much	   ‘my	  elephant’	   as	   I	  was	   ‘her	  human’,	   and	   this	  mutuality	  was	  acknowledged	  by	  all	  the	  handlers	  in	  discussing	  their	  working	  life.	  	  One’s	   elephant	   also	   represents	   a	   tutor,	   and	   the	   mutuality	   of	   companionship	  becomes	  especially	  evident	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  enskilment	  as	  a	  competent	  handler.	  	  As	  my	  mentor,	  Sitasma	  would	  for	  example,	  wiggle	  her	  head	  to	  inform	  me	  that	  I	  was	  misapplying	   my	   toes	   in	   transmitting	   driving	   instructions.	   	   Similarly,	   she	   would	  demonstrate	  that	  her	  insistence	  on	  turning	  left	  when	  I	  was	  trying	  to	  turn	  right	  was	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not	  disobedience	  on	  her	  part,	  but	  rather	  her	  revealing	  to	  me	  her	  preferred	  grazing	  foods,	  which	   it	  was	  my	  responsibility	   to	   learn,	  and	  which	   include	  medicinal	  plants	  that	  indicate	  digestive	  ill	  health.	  	  	  
(Slide	  5)	  Animality,	  Domination	  and	  Didactic	  Instruction	  But	   my	   apprenticeship	   with	   Sitasma	   was	   also	   mediated	   by	   Ram	   Ekval,	   her	   chief	  driver	  or	  phanit,	  in	  charge	  of	  her	  three	  man	  care	  team,	  and	  his	  didactic	  instruction	  served	  to	  shift	  the	  modal	  register	  from	  companionship	  to	  domination	  –	  a	  turn	  of	  the	  kaleidoscope	   yielding	   a	   new	   relational	   pattern.	   	   The	   language	   of	   instruction	  revolved	   around	   driving	   your	   elephant,	   suggesting	   a	   mechanistic	   perspective	   of	  handler-­‐directed	   control.	   Converting	   practical	   into	   propositional	   knowledge,	   Ram	  Ekval’s	   verbalizations	   instilled	   in	   me	   an	   inventory	   of	   verbal	   commands,	   and	   an	  understanding	  of	  when	  and	  how	  to	  use	  the	  stick	  (kocha)	  to	  discipline	  Sitasma.	   	  He	  also	  demonstrated	   the	  ways	   to	  depress	  my	   toes	   in	   order	   to	  make	   Sitasma	  go	   left,	  right,	  forwards,	  backwards,	  to	  sit,	  to	  stand,	  and	  so	  on,	  all	  to	  be	  mastered	  in	  practice	  through	   imitation.	   Constituting	   a	   set	   of	   techniques	   for	   intentional	   action,	   this	  emphasizes	   human	   control	   over	   elephants	   as	   objectified	   subjects,	   negating	  companionable	   mutuality	   in	   favor	   of	   domineering	   authority.	   	   The	   pedagogy	   of	  elephant	   handling	   then,	   widespread	   in	   hattisare	   discourse,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  mutuality	  of	  enskilment,	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  de-­‐emphasizing	  elephant	  personhood.	  	  	  This	   ontological	   rupture,	   this	   irreverent	   distancing	   from	   a	   personhood	   usually	  shared	  with	  elephants,	   is	  experienced	  by	  hattisare	  as	  problematic.	   	  As	  a	  necessary	  prelude	   to	   practical	   enskilment,	   it	   is	   tacitly	   acknowledged	   that	   such	  instrumentalized	   instruction	   exaggerates	   the	   realities	   of	   human	   control	   in	   captive	  elephant	  management	  –	  we	  would	  be	  fooling	  ourselves	  if	  we	  believed	  our	  mastery	  simply	   amounted	   to	   subjugation,	   since	   its	   efficacy	   is	   always	   dependent	   upon	  consent.	   	   The	   conundrum	   that	   the	   elephants’	   cooperation	   ultimately	   presents	   is	  explained	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  respectful	  relations,	  which	  is	  why	  I	  found	  the	   treatment	   of	   elephants	   as	   merely	   servile,	   animate	   machines	   to	   be	   such	   a	  powerful	  trope	  of	  cautionary	  tales	  in	  which	  bad	  handlers	  get	  what	  they	  deserve.	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(Slide	   6)	   The	   Kaleidoscopic	   Shifts	   Between	   Animality,	   Personhood,	   and	  
Divinity	  	  The	  proposition	  that	  elephants	  have	  personalities	  is	  considered	  self-­‐evident	  among	  Nepali	   hattisare,	   irrespective	   of	   one’s	   social	   and	   cultural	   conditioning.	   	   On	   many	  occasions	   this	   claim	   was	   supported	   by	   handlers	   explaining	   to	   me	   that	   elephants	  have	   memories	   of	   prior	   experiences	   that	   influence	   attitudes	   and	   behaviour,	   that	  elephants	   can	  effectively	   communicate	  preferences,	   that	   elephants	  have	   reasoning	  and	   problem-­‐solving	   abilities,	   and	   that	   elephants	   can	   demonstrate	   loyalty	   and	  affection,	   as	   well	   as	   bear	   a	   grudge!	   (see	   Varner	   2008).	   	   Aren’t	   those	   also	   the	  attributes	   of	   humans,	   they	   rhetorically	   asked?	   	   Here,	   it	   is	   correlated	   experiential	  knowledge	   of	   elephants	   that	   is	   given	   primacy	   in	   attributing	   personhood.	   	   Despite	  this	   however,	   there	   are	   other	   discursive	   contexts	   just	   like	   those	   of	   handling	  pedagogy,	   in	   which	   not	   only	   is	   domination	   emphasized	   over	   companionship,	   but	  personhood	  and	  divinity	  de-­‐emphasized	  in	  favor	  of	  animality.	  	  The	  spatial	  relations	  of	  the	  hattisar	  can	  be	  highly	  significant	  in	  this	  regard,	  with	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  parameters	  of	  personhood	  contract	  to	  exclude	  elephants.	  	  The	  stable	  is	   arranged	   like	   a	   set	   of	   nested	   circles,	   with	   the	   elephants	   on	   the	   perimeter,	  protecting	  the	  humans	  at	  the	  centre	  from	  the	  jungle	  surrounding	  the	  stable.	  	  In	  the	  evenings,	  in	  informal	  contexts	  free	  of	  handling	  duties	  (dipti),	  away	  from	  immediate	  proximity	  to	  their	  elephants,	  handlers	  relax,	  talk	  about	  themselves,	  and	  even	  indulge	  in	  irreverent	  joking.	  	  As	  a	  total	  institution	  (Goffman	  1961),	  the	  hattisar	  is	  totalizing	  in	   the	  way	   it	   structures	   a	   handler’s	   life	   and	   conditions	   their	   habitus	   (cf	  Bourdieu	  1990,	   Crossley	   2001),	   leaving	   little	   time	   free	   of	   obligation.	   	   Providing	   a	   rare	   (and	  only	   provisional)	   opportunity	   to	   define	   oneself	   outside	   of	   the	   context	   of	   the	  elephant	  to	  whom	  one	  is	  tied,	  these	  are	  times	  when	  handlers	  talk	  within	  the	  modal	  register	   of	   domination	   –	   talking	   of	   the	   challenge	   of	   maintaining	   control	   over	   a	  disobedient	   elephant	   during	  musth	   (a	   periodic	   hormonal	   surge	   that	  makes	  males	  aggressive),	   or	   during	   the	   ritual	   initiation	   of	   a	   juvenile’s	   driving	   training.	   	   And	   so	  another	  metaphoric	   turn	   of	   the	   kaleidoscope	   yields	   another	   configuration,	   one	   in	  which	  the	  elephant’s	  animality	  assumes	  primacy.	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By	   contrast,	   at	   the	   perimeter	   of	   the	   stable,	  when	  mounting	   one’s	   elephant	   before	  entering	  the	  jungle,	  when	  one	  is	  about	  to	  resume	  mutuality	  with	  one’s	  companion,	  most	   handlers	   reverentially	   touch	   their	   forehead,	   chest,	   and	   elephant’s	   flank	  with	  the	   first	   two	   fingers	   of	   their	   right	   hand,	   the	   same	   gestures	   as	   when	   one	   anoints	  oneself	   with	   tika	   powder	   as	   prasad,	   the	   consecrated	   leftovers	   from	   puja,	   a	  devotional	   act	  of	  worship.	   	  Ram	  Ekval	   explained	   to	  me	   that	   this	  was	   the	  hattisare	  way	   of	   acknowledging	   your	   elephant’s	   divinity	   and	   requesting	   the	   goodwill	   and	  protection	  of	  Ganesh	   the	  elephant-­‐headed	  god,	  whilst	   riding	  his	   incarnation.	   	  This	  may	   be	   seen	   to	   serve	   the	   purpose	   of	   counter-­‐balancing	   the	   modal	   register	   of	  domination	   which	   life	   in	   the	   separate	   interior	   can	   encourage,	   with	   the	   modal	  register	  of	   veneration	  which	   life	   in	   the	   exterior	   requires.	  As	   another	  phanit,	  Satya	  Narayan	  explained:	  “We	  ride	  you	  as	  a	  servant,	  but	  we	  know	  you	  are	  a	  god”.	  
	  
(Slide	  7)	  Caste,	  Cosmos,	  and	  Divinity	  This	   then	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   final	   section	   of	   my	   argument,	   in	   which	   I	   explore	   the	  modality	   of	   devotion	   and	   the	   ontological	   status	   of	   divinity	   through	   hattisares’	  underlying	  cosmological	   ideas	  about	  nature,	  authority,	  and	   the	   logic	  of	   caste.	   	  The	  jungle	   is	   emblematic	   of	   nature	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   a	   wild	   domain	   not	   ostensibly	  transformed	  by	  human	  activity	  (Ellen	  1996).	  	  In	  Chitwan,	  the	  jungle	  is	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  Tharu	  forest	  goddess	  Ban	  Devi	  who	  controls	  dangerous	  animals	  like	  tigers	  that	  frequent	  it.	  	  Testament	  to	  this,	  five	  years	  previous	  to	  my	  doctoral	  fieldwork	  with	  the	  Chitwan	   hattisare,	   a	   handler	   was	   killed	   by	   a	   tiger	   whilst	   out	   with	   his	   elephant	  cutting	  grass.	  Her	  potential	  anger	  must	  be	  appeased	  by	  conducting	  sacrificial	  rituals	  involving	   gifts	   pleasing	   to	   her	   ferocious	   ‘substance-­‐nature’.	   These	   include	   meat,	  alcohol,	   money,	   and	   feminine	   items	   of	   beautification.	   	   Similarly,	   the	   goodwill	   of	  Ganesh	  must	  be	  petitioned	  with	   gifts	   pleasing	   to	  his	   ‘substance-­‐nature’,	   especially	  during	  the	  ritual	  period	  of	  elephant	  training,	   in	  which	  a	   juvenile	   is	  separated	  from	  its	   mother	   and	   paired	   with	   a	   human	   companion	   who	   temporarily	   adopts	   ascetic	  vows	  of	  ritual	  purity	   (sanyas).	   	  With	  a	  renowned	  appetite	  celebrated	   in	  myth,	   it	   is	  sweets	   that	   must	   be	   given	   to	   the	   vegetarian	   Ganesh,	   whose	   divine	   ‘substance-­‐
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nature’	   incarnates	  the	  sacred	  elephants	  that	  handlers	  apologetically	  drive	  and	  rely	  on	  for	  their	  safety	  in	  the	  jungle.	  	  The	  conception	  of	  nature	  evident	   in	   these	  practices	  and	  their	  supporting	  beliefs	   is	  not	   so	   much	   the	   one	   of	   the	   nature/culture	   dualism	   of	   western	   thought	   that	  categorically	   separates,	   but	   is	   instead	   one	   that	   distinguishes	   the	   wild	   from	   the	  socialized	   along	   a	   continuum	   (Ellen	   1996).	   	   Following	   the	   Durkheimian	   symbolic	  ecology	  of	  Phillipe	  Descola	  (1992,	  1996),	  I	  term	  the	  handlers’	  conception	  of	  nature	  sociocentric	   in	   that	   domains	   distinguished	   by	   western	   thought	   as	   nature	   and	  society,	   are	   here	   understood	   as	   subject	   to	   the	   same	   organizing	   logic,	  modeled	   on	  anthropic	   understandings.	   This	   is	   evident	   in	   the	   tenurial	   sovereignty	   of	   Bikram	  
Baba,	   clearly	  modeled	   on	   the	   hierarchical	   authority	   of	   the	   king	   as	   the	   lord	   of	   the	  land	  (Burghart	  1978:521-­‐524).	   	  Perhaps	  more	  significant	  though,	   is	  the	  organising	  logic	  of	  caste	  in	  terms	  of	  shared	  substance,	  presented	  as	  typical	  of	  Hindu	  and	  South	  Asian	  thought	  in	  McKim	  Marriott’s	  Ethnosociology	  (Marriott	  1976,	  Marriott	  &	  Inden	  1977,	  Marriott	  1989,	  and	  see	  also	  Moffatt	  1990).	  	  To	  explain	  -­‐	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  all	  life	  shares	  substance	  that	  varies	  according	  to	  the	  ratio	  of	  its	  component	  qualities,	  the	  three	  humoral	  guna	  of	  satvas,	  rajas,	  and	  tamas,	  which	   can	   be	   transmuted	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   action	   or	   karma,	   which	  determines	   rebirth	   in	   the	   cycle	   of	   life,	   or	   samsara,	   it	   follows	   that	   the	   ontological	  separation	  of	  animality,	  humanity	  and	  divinity	  is	  ultimately	  permeable.	  	  In	  previous	  existences	  we	  may	  have	  dwelt	  as	  animals,	  but	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  godhood	  within	  us	  all,	  in	  a	  future	  existence	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  realize	  our	  intrinsically	  divine	  nature	  and	   ascend	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   being,	   evident	   in	   the	   ubiquitous	   Hindi	   and	   Nepali	  greeting	  of	  namaste	  meaning;	  “I	  salute	  that	  bit	  of	  god	  that	  dwells	  within	  you”	  (Babb	  1975:52).	  	  	  This	  simultaneity	  of	  animality	  and	  divinity	  in	  elephants	  encompasses	  both	  low	  and	  high	   status	  within	   a	   hierarchic	   continuum	  of	   being.	   	   Puzzling	   upon	   this	   led	  me	   to	  consider	  the	  implicit	  logic	  of	  caste	  and	  how	  integral	  it	  is	  to	  the	  handlers’	  hierarchic	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and	   sociocentric	   conception	   of	   cosmic	   nature.	   	   The	   word	   for	   caste,	   a	   group	   of	  identical	  substance,	   i.e.	  of	  guna	  composition,	  whose	  interactions	  with	  other	  groups	  of	  differing	  substance-­‐nature	  must	  be	  strategically	  and	  ritually	  mediated	  according	  to	   a	   rationale	   of	   purity,	   is	   jãt.	   	   This	  word	   also	  means	   type,	   kind,	   or	   even	   species	  (Marriott	  &	   Inden	  1977,	  Burghart	  1984:116-­‐118).	   	  Thus	   it	  was	   that	   I	   realized	  that	  for	  the	  handlers	  there	  was	  no	  problem	  in	  extending	  the	  logic	  of	  caste	  to	  elephants,	  it	  being	  as	  much	  an	  essentialist	  theory	  of	  kinds,	  as	  a	  social	  theory	  of	  discrete,	  ranked	  groups	  (Burghart	  1978).	  	  	  Indeed,	   the	  Sanskrit	  genre	  of	   texts	  on	  elephantology,	  known	  as	  Gaja	  Sastra,	  which	  parallel	   oral	   traditions	   of	   practical	   knowledge,	   and	   continued	   to	   influence	   Nepali	  veterinarian	   texts	   into	   the	   early	   20th	   century	   (see	   Karki	   1923	   in	   Shrestha	   et	   al	  1985),	   recognize	   eight	   ranked	   castes	   of	   elephant,	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   guna	  composition	   (Edgerton	  1931,	  Locke	  2008).	   	  For	  example,	   the	  rajo	  guni	  elephant	   is	  angry,	   impatient	   and	   restless,	   the	   tamo	   guni	   elephant	   is	   disobedient,	   fearful	   and	  weak,	  whilst	  the	  satva	  guni	  elephant	  is	  of	  good	  temperament,	  beautiful	  appearance,	  and	  is	  quick	  to	  learn.	  	  In	  everyday	  practice,	  three	  classes	  of	  elephant	  are	  recognized,	  by	  form	  rather	  than	  ‘substance-­‐nature’,	  just	  as	  Sanderson	  reported	  for	  Bengal	  in	  the	  19th	   century	   (1878).	   	   These	   may	   be	   seen	   as	   analogous	   to	   varna,	   the	   hierarchic	  classes	   into	  which	  castes	  are	  grouped	  (Marriott	  2004),	  and	   include	  koomeriah,	  the	  regal	   first-­‐rate,	  dwásala,	   the	   blended	   second-­‐rate,	   and	  meerga,	   the	   deer-­‐like	   third	  rate.	  	  For	  hattisare	  the	  taxonomic	  principle	  of	  caste	  to	  which	  the	  ordering	  of	  people	  is	   subject	   is	   then	   theoretically	   as	   applicable	   to	   relations	   between	   humans	   and	  elephants	   as	   it	   is	   among	   humans	   and	   among	   elephants.	   	   The	   idea	   of	   two	   castes	  ritually	   regulating	   their	   interactions	  with	   each	   other	   seems	   highly	   appropriate	   to	  the	  situation	  pertaining	  to	  human	  and	  elephant	  in	  the	  sarkari	  hattisar	  of	  Nepal.	  	  
(Slide	  8)	  Conclusion	  	  Three	  ontological	  states	  (animality,	  personhood,	  and	  divinity)	  have	  been	  correlated	  with	   three	   relational	   modalities	   (domination,	   companionship	   and	   veneration).	   	   I	  have	  intimated	  the	  modality	  of	  domination	  in	  didactic	  commentary	  and	  in	  demotic	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discourse	   in	   the	   interior	   of	   the	   stable;	   the	   modality	   of	   companionship	   in	   the	  mutuality	  of	  embodied	  practice	  in	  the	  jungle;	  and	  the	  modality	  of	  veneration	  both	  in	  special	   ritual	   events	   that	   pair	   elephants	  with	   humans,	   and	   in	   everyday	   ritual	   acts	  just	   before	   humans	   enter	   the	   dangerous	   exterior	   of	   the	   jungle.	   Crucially	   though,	  these	  ontological	  states	  and	  relational	  modalities	  are	  not	  exclusive.	  	  Rather,	  they	  are	  differentially	  emphasized	  in	  contextually	  contingent	  ways,	  each	  informing	  the	  other	  like	  the	  refractive	  play	  of	  light	  on	  the	  glass	  beads	  that	  produces	  the	  beautiful	  forms	  of	   the	   kaleidoscope.	   	   The	   production	   of	   beautiful	   form	   (kalos	   and	   eidos)	   is	   also	  metaphorically	  significant	  in	  this	  multispecies	  ethnography	  (Kirksey	  and	  Helmreich	  2010)	   since	   through	   this	   plural,	   overlapping	   status	   handlers	   learn	   to	   hold	   their	  elephants	   in	   esteem	   and	   regard	   by	   paying	   reciprocal	   attention	   –	   just	   the	   kind	   of	  interdependent,	   cross-­‐species	   relationship	   that	   Donna	   Haraway	   recognizes	   as	   a	  thing	  of	  beauty.	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